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Despite these shortcomings in Arceneaux’s overall framework, the nu-
anced and insightful discussion of the individual cases offers multiple insights
into the operation of and levels of success engineered by military regimes. The
systematic discussion and comparison of ve of the most-studied military re-
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Many scholarly and casual observers contend that the dramatic post-1970s rise
in international capital mobility and upward postwar trend in trade integration,
by sharpening capital’s threat against domestic governments to ee purportedly
excessive and inefcient welfare systems, has forced and will continue to force
welfare-state retrenchment. Several important recent studies of the compara-
tive and international political economy of policy change over this period, now
including Duane Swank’s impressive theoretical and empirical study, challenge
these claims. His argument that the institutional structure of the polity and of
the welfare system itself shapes the domestic policy response to capital (and
trade) integration represents a basis for challenging the globalization-induces-
retrenchment argument.
Swank’s argument does not fundamentally challenge claims of the exclusive
or superior macroeconomic efciency of neoliberal minimalism but rather stresses
the primacy of domestic political conditions—the policy-making access, cohe-
sion and organization, and the relative power of contending pro- and anti-
welfare interests—in determining the direction and magnitude of welfare-pol-
icy reactions to international economic integration. Specically, he argues and
nds that inclusive electoral institutions, social-corporatist interest-representa-
tion and policy making, centralized political authority, and universal welfare
systems relatively favor the political access and capacity for pro-welfare inter-
ests and bolster supportive social norms in the domestic political struggle over
the response to integration. He does this by means of cross-national, cross-tem-
poral statistical analysis supplemented by thorough qualitative case explora-
tions of generous welfare states and briefer explorations of less-generous sys-
tems. The opposite conditions favor antiwelfare interests and norms in this
struggle. Globalization thus induces increased welfare largesse in generous
states and retrenchment in tight ones, that is, divergence not convergence.
This book offers the most directly and thoroughly political approach of its
genre. It is also the most thoroughly explored empirically, offering compara-
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tive-historical statistical analyses of the argument against six alternative inter-
pretations of the globalization-induces-retrenchment thesis: the simple version
(a regression including one of ve capital-openness measures), and ve others
he terms the run-to-the-bottom (capital openness times lagged welfare-policy),
convergence (capital openness times gap from own to cross-country mean wel-
fare-policy), nonlinear (capital openness and its square), trade-and-capital-open-
ness (their product), capital-openness-times-scal-stress (decits times capital
openness), and capital-ight (net foreign direct investment) versions. He nds
little support for any globalization-induces-retrenchment argument. He gives
some indications that capital mobility tends on average to enhance welfare
effort, perhaps supporting those emphasizing its effect in increasing popular
demand for social insurance against global risks.
The reader might wish for the following:
 Further theoretical development of why inclusive institutions necessarily
favor pro- over antiwelfare interests’ access; but, contrarily, decentraliza-
tion favors anti- over pro-welfare forces.
 Separate theoretical elaboration and empirical evaluation of the individual
components of the amalgamated concepts of electoral inclusiveness—
proportionality and fractionalization—and authority dispersion—presiden-
tialism, federalism, bicameralism, referendum-usage.
 Theoretical and empirical comparison of the argument to alternatives
from the political-economy literature rather than or in addition to the com-
parison with the six conventional-wisdom hypotheses.
 More thorough exposition of the exact empirical models estimated and
their results and/or simpler structures of those models (as examples: com-
plicated tables of regression results appear without previous mathematical
statement of the estimated equation(s); the models contain dummies for
unspecied series breaks and for unnamed subsets of countries, which se-
verely complicate interpretation especially for near-time-invariant indices
like authority dispersion and for time-trended measures; and interactive ef-
fects are discussed without tables, graphs, or information on the value-ranges
of the component variables, which would greatly aid their interpretation.
Swank’s central argument that domestic political conditions—electoral in-
clusiveness, social corporatism, authority centralization, and existing welfare-
system structure—shape democratic governments’ responses to economic inte-
gration, spurring divergence more than convergence, is logically persuasive,
theoretically satisfying, and empirically supported.
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